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mid-1920s when the party generally shifted responsi-
bility for social propaganda to higher organs. As work-
ers’ club directors and trade union officials assumed re-
sponsibility for the agitation trials from local activists,
verdicts that focused on individual guilt superseded col-
lective social responsibility for problems, and punish-
ment for wrongdoing displaced social enlightenment as
a prime objective. Crimes of commission (mistreatment
of machines) and omission (failure to join “voluntary”
Soviet social organizations such as the Society of the
Friends of the Air Force) both brought forth denun-
ciation under the guise of criticism and self-criticism,
which replaced the dialogues characteristic of the ear-
lier agitation trials. As distinctions between reality and
theatricality thus became even more blurred in the sec-
ond half of the 1920s, the Communist Youth League
staged trials of private behavior that signaled the state’s
increasing intrusion into the spheres of family, moral-
ity, and personal life. And by the time the party began
conducting real show trials of engineers and technical
specialists in 1928, emphasis had permanently shifted to
identifying scapegoats rather than debating values. As
Wood demonstrates convincingly, the mock trials of
1930–1933 had become so dominated by schematic
characters and stories that they lacked dramatic inter-
est, even as they laid the foundation for the Manichean
Stalinist show trials of 1936–1938.
This book stands on a substantial body of sources.
Researching a genre that valued spontaneity and some-
times proceeded without a script presents special prob-
lems to the researcher, which makes Wood’s vast array
of sources all the more impressive. Moreover, she en-
hances the volume of the evidence with the keen insight
she shows in analyzing the large number of plays that
illustrate her story. Drawing on anthropology and so-
ciology, Wood weaves a sophisticated interplay be-
tween the perspectives of the organizers and audience/
participants that no short review can reproduce
adequately. The result is a fascinating account of the
rapid road from socialist utopia to Soviet distopia that
deserves a wide audience.
WILLIAM B. HUSBAND
Oregon State University
CATRIONA KELLY. Comrade Pavlik: The Rise and Fall of
a Soviet Boy Hero. London: Granta Books. 2005. Pp.
xxxii, 352. £17.99.
Pavlik Morozov was arguably the most famous child in
Soviet history. Catriona Kelly’s account of his life,
death, and legend begins with a description of Soviet
ten-year-olds gathered around a bonfire at a Young Pi-
oneer camp, listening to the story for the first time:
“Long ago, before you were born . . . back in the early
1930s, there was a little boy, not much older than you”
(p. xxii) whose father was working against the collec-
tivization of the Soviet countryside. When good little
Pioneer Pavlik found out, he reported his father to the
police. In retaliation, his relatives brutally murdered
him and his younger brother.
The rest of Catriona Kelly’s wide-ranging and engag-
ing book aims to destabilize and deconstruct every as-
pect of this campfire story. Kelly seeks to uncover
Morozov’s “real life” and to trace the creation, trans-
mission, reception, mutation, and eventual eclipse of
the Pavlik legend. The result is a book that is part mur-
der mystery and part scholarly analysis of Soviet pro-
paganda in the making that may hold as much appeal
for real crime buffs as for historians of the Soviet Union
and of childhood more generally.
Kelly’s examination of the rise and fall of the Pavlik
legend proves a useful lens through which to view Soviet
conceptions of children and childhood. From the first
years of Bolshevik power, Soviet propaganda pictured
children as active fighters for revolution. During the
campaign to remake the countryside, the Pioneer press
featured stories of children clashing with neighbors and
even parents who were reluctant to join the collective
farms. She emphasizes that such propaganda had the
capacity to inspire the young, and “children who de-
nounced were not just a figment of propagandists’ imag-
ination” (p. 41).
Still, whether Pavlik was a dedicated Pioneer de-
nouncer, as the legend claimed, remains unclear.
Granted unprecedented access to the once secret
Morozov case file in the Central Archive of the Federal
Security Service (formerly the KGB), Kelly provides a
detailed—perhaps too detailed for some tastes—ac-
count of the murder investigation. Ultimately neither
the case file, other archival sources, nor interviews with
surviving villagers yield definitive answers to questions
regarding Pavlik’s life and death. An exhaustive review
of the available evidence leaves the central event of de-
nunciation “not proven” (p. 239).
The case file does, however, shed considerable light
on how investigators and journalists began the process
of turning Pavlik into a national cult figure. The local
police initially viewed the two boys found murdered in
the woods in September 1932 as victims of a village
quarrel. Within a few days, however, the arrival of the
district political police (OGPU) turned the investiga-
tion in a more ideological direction. Investigators now
described Pavlik as a prominent pro-Soviet activist and
sought evidence of a murderous conspiracy of wealthy
peasants. Some two months later, when the central
press picked up the story of the grisly murders, Pavlik’s
denunciation of his father gained new prominence, and
the local boy activist began to be transformed into a
“Soviet saint” (p. 109). The process culminated a year
after the murders, when the novelist Maxim Gorky de-
cided to promote the story.
Just as Pavlik was reaching the pinnacle of fame in
the mid-1930s, however, the legend came into conflict
with changing conceptions of childhood. By 1936, So-
viet propaganda and law (notably the banning of abor-
tion) sought to endorse and enforce “traditional family
values” (p. 148). Kelly surveys updated Stalinist ver-
sions of the Pavlik legend that turned the boy into a
model pupil and downplayed the “junior vigilante” (p.
155) theme. After Joseph Stalin’s death, his successors
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made what Kelly judges to be an unsuccessful attempt
to rehabilitate the Pavlik cult in tandem with a reha-
bilitation of the “ideal of the self-assertive child” (p.
198), whose self-assertion was in the service of Soviet
values.
While focusing on shifts in official conceptions of
childhood, the book also attempts to discern what chil-
dren made of the legend. Drawing on oral histories and
memoirs, Kelly argues that young people in the 1930s
often responded to Pavlik’s self-sacrifice, rather than
his act of denunciation. She finds that by the 1940s, Pav-
lik was less popular—among both the producers of the
Pioneer press and the children who consumed it—than
wartime martyrs and the fictional Timur, a lovable
youthful adventurer. In the late Soviet period, distaste
for Pavlik the denouncer seems to have grown, even as
war heroes remained on their pedestals. By the post-
Soviet period, Pavlik had become a “fallen hero” (p.
218), a symbol of the worst excesses of the Soviet state
and, Kelly argues, a cause of post-Soviet society’s deep
suspicion of whistle blowing. While not all readers will
agree that “the Pavlik legend is central to the under-
standing of Soviet history” (p. 15), Kelly’s book pro-
vides a nuanced account of how Soviet practices, from
police investigations to campfires, turned a real life and
death into myth.
LISA A. KIRSCHENBAUM
West Chester University
MIDDLE EAST AND NORTHERN AFRICA
DONALD BLOXHAM. The Great Game of Genocide: Im-
perialism, Nationalism, and the Destruction of the Otto-
man Armenians. New York: Oxford University Press.
2005. Pp. xiv, 329. $35.00.
Throughout the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Em-
pire tried to stave off military defeat and dissolution as
it was beleaguered by the Great Powers and harried by
its own minorities. In dealing with the European em-
pires, various sultans tried to strengthen the state, mod-
ernize the military, and balance one power against the
other in the great game of international politics. In
dealing with minorities, the sultans vacillated between
reform on the one hand and repression on the other.
Nor did the Ottomans shrink from widespread massa-
cre as a method of intimidating or even eliminating mi-
norities that called for or seemed to demand self-de-
termination.
In 1894–1896, under the rule of Sultan Abdu¨lhamid
II, tens of thousands of Armenians were massacred, fol-
lowing a period when some political parties had agi-
tated for Armenian independence and had called on the
Great Powers for aid in their efforts. In 1908, the Young
Turks staged a political revolution. They were led by the
Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), whose orig-
inal purpose was to reform the empire in order to pre-
serve it. But after the disastrous Balkan wars of 1912,
the Young Turks and the CUP were themselves further
radicalized as they abandoned earlier pluralist notions
and became converts to a hard-edged integral Turkish
nationalism. Whereas even under Abdu¨lhamid II, Ar-
menians and other minorities had legitimate albeit in-
ferior roles to play in the empire, increasingly under the
nationalists no Christian minority had a secure place in
the new Turkey. The Armenians especially aroused the
CUP’s suspicions: they could make claims to be the
original settlers of Anatolia—the heartland of Tur-
key—and their population centers in the east were lo-
cated on the border with Russia, Turkey’s traditional
enemy.
Even before World War I, the Armenians were
viewed as a possible fifth column, an internal threat
linked to an external enemy. Once the war started, what
seemed to be theoretical became perceived by the CUP
as a real danger. It is in this context that Armenians in
the army were grouped into labor battalions, which
were later massacred. At the same time Armenian com-
munal leaders were forced on the pain of death to sur-
render weapons, even if they had none to give up.
(Some communities actually purchased weapons so that
they could be seen as complying with government or-
ders!) Then in 1915, as the war turned against the Turks
in the east, the CUP orchestrated the deportation of the
Armenians, supposedly to protect the eastern provinces
from Russian invasion and Armenian collusion. It soon
became apparent that the deportations were not a
means for moving a possibly unreliable population from
the front; instead they became the principal method for
destroying the Armenian community. More than a mil-
lion Armenians perished as the deportee caravans were
set upon by organized killers and tribesmen. What mass
murder left undone, mass starvation and disease fin-
ished off. Some scholars estimate that about ninety per-
cent of the deportees perished en route to the Syrian
desert. This destruction has come to be known as the
Armenian Genocide by most scholars of the events. To
this day, however, the Turkish government denies that
the deportations were genocidal and claims that the Ar-
menians perished in the course of a civil war that they
themselves had provoked.
Donald Bloxham has recast and reinterpreted these
events, and in doing so he has made an important and
original contribution to the historiography of the Ar-
menian genocide and to the analysis of its denial by the
Turkish authorities. Bloxham disagrees with a standard
explanation that posits a prewar conspiracy among
CUP leaders who took the opportunity of war with the
Entente, especially Russia, to commit genocide against
the Armenians. Neither does he subscribe to the “prov-
ocation thesis.” Instead, Bloxham tries to demonstrate
how, during World War I, integral Turkish nationalists
like Mehmed Talaˆt Pas¸a, Enver Pas¸a, and others mag-
nified the Armenian threat, which led to a self-fulfilling
prophecy whereby Turkish repressions evoked Arme-
nian resistance in some cases like Musa Dagh and Van.
Turkish nationalists then reinterpreted Armenian self-
defense as aggression and treachery. Bloxham calls this
a process of “cumulative policy radicalization,” a term
which he borrows from the historiography of the Ho-
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